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1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, a small but very productive Post-Keynesian and Marxian 
research community has engaged in the elaboration of a scientific research programme 
(SRP) that has come to be known as wage and profit-led regime research.1 In dozens of 
journal articles in almost every heterodox economic journal, particularly the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, the primary aim has been to reiterate the classical political 
economy conception of functional income distribution as a major determinant of 
economic development and employment, from both a Keynesian (effective demand) and 
Marxian (class struggle) perspective. Only recently, the Review of Keynesian Economics 
(RoKE) dedicated - convening almost the entire ‘wage and profit-led regime’ community 
- an incredible four (consecutive) issues to delineating and discussing this Denkstil. The 
International Labour Office (ILO), meanwhile, commissioned a major research initiative 
investigating the relationship between functional income distribution and growth (see 
Lavoie/Stockhammer 2013a).2 
Since only very few critical voices (such as Peter Skott (2017) joined this illustrious 
debate, I would like to re-open this discussion about the scientific and political merits of 
the ‘wage and profit-led regime’ approach. My intention is to examine whether this SRP 
can fill an obvious gap in Post-Keynesian theory. In accordance with Keynes’ 
considerable neglect of distributional questions in his General Theory, most Post-
Keynesians have underemphasised a phenomenon that has become one of the most 
socially and politically concerning problems of our times: growing income inequality.    
This article is structured as follows: in the next section, the main arguments of the wage 
and profit-led regime approach will be delineated and scrutinised with reference to the 
Bhaduri-Marglin model, which is regarded as ‘a widely used workhorse model’ 
(Stockhammer 2017: 25). I will subsequently question its theoretical bases, its empirical 
validity, and its policy applicability. Finally, I offer a number of concluding remarks on 
the merits of the distributional regime approach. 
2. Distribution and growth: A critical examination of the Bhaduri/Marglin model  
In classical political economics, conflicts over the distribution of income always underlie 
macroeconomic development in capitalist economies (see e.g. Sandmo 2015). From a 
Marxian perspective, profit reductions hamper capital accumulation and are therefore 
harmful to economic growth, income generation, and employment, since capitalists will 
be less able to follow their maxim: ‘Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the 
Prophets’ (Marx 1887: 418). In Keynesian economics, on the other hand, wage income 
constitutes the largest share of consumption spending, which likewise accounts for the 
largest share of effective demand in any capitalist economy. Although  Keynes showed 
little interest in distributional questions in his General Theory (see e.g. Keynes 1939), he 
                                                          
1 To name just a few of the studies produced by this community: Dutt (1984); Blecker (1989); 
Bhaduri/Marglin (1990); Lavoie (1995); Onaran/Galanis (2012); Lavoie/Stockhammer (2013a).    
2 Interestingly, the ILO initiative has been acknowledged by mainstream economics (see e.g. 
Francese/Mulas-Granados 2015), while the distributional regime research has been entirely 
ignored (see e.g. Atkinson 2009; Bentolila/Saint-Paul 2003; Elsby 2013; Charpe/Bridji/McAdam 
2019). 
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did highlight certain channels through which changes in income distribution may have an 
effect on growth and employment, the most obvious being the impact of income 
inequality on marginal propensity to consume as a determining factor of effective 
demand. Nevertheless, in General Theory, even this channel is only addressed in an aside, 
which appears to concern personal rather than functional income distribution: ‘If fiscal 
policy is used as a deliberate instrument for the more equal distribution of incomes, its 
effect in increasing the propensity to consume is, of course, all the greater’ (Keynes 1936: 
95). Furthermore, the fact that Keynes approaches a change in (personal) income 
distribution in terms of state action (fiscal policy or taxation) rather than the struggle 
between different socioeconomic actors over an appropriate income share (class conflict 
over functional income) suggests that, in his eyes, functional income distribution is an 
endogenously determined resultant, not an exogenous determinant of growth, income, 
and employment. 
Changes in functional income distribution may then be assessed very differently with 
respect to their impact on economic growth and employment.3 They may be regarded as 
a major determining factor with contrasting signs, such as the positive or negative impact 
of a growing wage share and, vice versa, the negative or positive impact of a growing 
profit share, depending on whether the consumption channel (Keynes) or the investment 
channel (Marx) is regarded as dominant. Or they may be regarded as insignificant, in 
accordance with the Keynesian understanding of functional income distribution – as of 
growth, income, and employment – as an endogenously determined result of economic 
activity based on a given and controllable set of factors such as technologies and 
techniques, tastes, preferences, propensities, institutions, and policies but not as an 
outcome of the conflictual actions of collective socioeconomic actors.     
Unlike most subsequent contributors, Bhaduri and Marglin (Bhaduri/Marglin 1990: 375-
6; henceforth ‘B/M paper’) were entirely explicit in their seminal paper about Keynes’ 
(and as they claim with reference to the ‘wage theorem’, Kalecki’s) insistence on the 
endogeneity of functional income distribution (and thus the insignificance of functional 
income distribution with respect to growth and employment in the above sense). They 
nonetheless depart from this view for two reasons: 1) even mere ‘thought experiments’, 
they claim, may provide useful insights; 2) the argument concerning the endogeneity of 
functional income distribution is premised on a closed economy, and may not apply to an 
open economy. Later we will need to return to these two qualifications, since they are 
crucial for any evaluation of the wage and profit-led regime approach but have 
nonetheless been entirely ignored in most of the theoretical discussion and empirical 
specifications that followed the publication of the B/M paper.   
For now, let us consider the B/M paper’s assumption that pure ‘thought experiments’ – 
i.e. the assumption that the owners of the factors of production can deliberately determine 
                                                          
3 We will be concerned only with long-run considerations here, since ‘regimes’ are structural 
arrangements that are better able to explain long-term phenomena (i.e. growth) than short-term 
phenomena (i.e. business cycles). We shall therefore ignore the debate on capital utilisation (see 
e.g. Nikoforos 2012), in line with the assumption that capital utilisation will always have to be at 
its ‘normal’ level in the long term. 
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the real remuneration rates of their factors4 – may produce valuable insights. One such 
insight, which has been quoted a number of times, is that it may be theoretically possible 
to vindicate both signs of the impact of changing functional income distribution. 
Depending on the impact of a change in the wage rate or – what is synonymous for this 
model – the wage share (or, conversely, a change in the profit rate or profit share) on 
consumption and investment spending, an increase in the wage share (or real wage rate) 
will either positively affect effective demand and thus growth and employment (on the 
wage-led regime misleadingly associated with Keynes) or negatively affect it on the 
profit-led regime associated with Marx. This conclusion rests, of course, on the specific 
assumptions set out in the B/M paper (and the entire wage-led, profit-led regime 
literature). These are: 1) a ‘classical’ saving hypothesis in which savings are only derived 
from capital income (implying a higher marginal propensity toward consumption among 
labourers than capitalists); 2) a constant quantity of labour per unit of final output 
(implying a correspondence between average and marginal labour productivity); 3) an 
investment function determined by the profit rate (and in the short run by the difference 
between ‘normal’ or ‘desired’ and actual capital utilisation); 4) a profit margin (mark-up) 
determined by capitalists; (5) the independence of savings from investment and 6) a 
(certain) price-elasticity of exports in an open economy and a lack of exchange rate or 
real wage movement-based compensating measures on the part of trading partners (for a 
discussion of a binational case, see Stockhammer/Onaran 2013: 65f.). Whether an 
economy can be considered ‘wage-led’ or ‘profit-led’ obviously depends on the 
difference between the two socioeconomic classes’ propensities to consume, the profit-
rate elasticity of investment spending, and the price elasticity of exports. Larger, more 
closed economies are more likely to be wage-led, while smaller, more open economies 
are likely to be profit-led.   
The classical saving hypothesis does not of course claim to be very realistic, but serves 
to ensure a positive difference between the consumption propensities of the different 
classes. This difference is anything but logically obvious, however, since a household’s 
propensity to consume sensibly depends on its income levels, rather than its source of 
income. And even if it were empirically to hold,5 the underlying idea that an increase in 
aggregate demand due to increased consumption spending is associated with an increase 
in the wage share (i.e. the wage-led regime) is easily contestable once we distinguish 
between the wage income of ‘operative workers’ and the earned income of 
‘administrative workers’, both of which make up the overall wage share. If functional 
income distribution changes in favour of the wage share and personal income distribution 
becomes ever more unequal due to managers’ salaries increasing exorbitantly while 
operative workers’ wages stagnate (as has been the case in the past 2 to 3 decades), the 
argument for a wage-led regime begins to crumble6. 
                                                          
4 This, according to Keynes (1933a; 1933b), can only be true in a ‘real-wage, co-operative or 
neutral economy’ but not in the ‘money-wage or entrepreneur economy… that we actually live in 
today’ (Keynes 1933a: 78). 
5 For empirical evidence to the contrary, see Bowles/Boyer (1995) and Marglin (1984). 
6 Palley (2017) incorporates issues of personal income distribution by relaxing the classical 
savings assumption and introducing capitalist-managers earning wage as well as capital income. 
The paper shows „the importance of the distribution of wages for whether an economy is wage- 
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The fixed labour-coefficient assumption (i.e. a limitational Leontief production function) 
is needed for two reasons: firstly, it secures the correspondence between the direction of 
change in the factor remuneration shares and rates. If we were instead to assume an 
ordinary Cobb-Douglass environment (i.e. a substitutional production function with 
elasticities of substitution different from zero), this correspondence would become 
blurry.7 Secondly, the assumption allows us to presuppose the exogenous character of 
functional distribution, which is a fundamental element of the whole approach. Now, the 
price-level p is determined by average (variable) costs (nominal unit labour cost) bw 
(where 1/b = average labour productivity and w = nominal wage rate) and a mark-up (m) 
set by firms: 
P = (1 + m) bw       (1) 
If we take the mark-up as given and the labour coefficient as technically determined, 
setting the nominal wage rate will also determine the real wage rate. Simply changing the 
mark-up (see assumption 4, above) will result in the wage rate and, correspondingly, the 
wage share (and of course, the profit rate and profit share) changing in the same direction 
and thus becoming an exogenous variable in the control sense. This is probably why most 
adherents of this approach do not consider the assumption of exogeneity as merely a 
‘thought experiment’ but rather as a crucial characteristic of their neo-Kaleckian, neo-
Marxian models. It nonetheless rests on the assumption that the mark-up is a source of 
conflict between the two socioeconomic classes and thus a power-related variable. Yet, it 
has never been convincingly shown how a shift in power relations can influence the mark-
up.8 All that the socioeconomic classes can struggle over in a capitalist economy is the 
nominal wage rate,9 and not the real wage rate. Whether a change in the nominal wage 
rate will translate into a change in the real wage rates depends on the extent to which 
firms are able to set the price of their commodities. This in turn depends on the level of 
competition in the commodity market. As long as this does not change, it is difficult to 
see how firms should be able to increase their mark-up even though labour might have 
weakened10. The real wage rate required to determine functional income distribution is 
                                                          
or profit-led, and changes in the distribution of wages can change an economy’s character“ (Palley 
2017: 59). 
7 A Leontief production function may be a good short-term representation of industrial 
production, but not of non-industrial production involving administrative workers in the long run. 
8 For Kalecki himself, the mark-up is determined by what he terms the ‘degree of monopoly’. 
There are indications that in his earlier writings the degree of monopoly is entirely dependent on 
the commodity market structure, while in his later writings, it is also affected by class struggle on 
the labour market (see Rugitsky 2013). Yet what Rugitsky (2013: 452) has called a ‘subtle 
argument’ (citing Kalecki 1965: 18) can less affectionately be termed ‘flawed’, since it implies 
that rising nominal wages threaten the competitive position of a firm or industry. Nevertheless, 
what is true for a single firm under perfect competition (where price is given) cannot be true for 
all firms under imperfect competition (where prices are set by firms) and collectively bargained 
nominal wages.   
9 And, of course, the wage structure, which has a strong impact on personal income distribution. 
10 Eichner (1973) shows that the distributional conflict between the socioeconomic classes in the 
labour market will trigger a wage-price spiral but will not change the mark-up. Making class 
conflict an issue of income distribution is of course a long-standing feature of classical political 
economics. Nevertheless, attempts to demonstrate the (limited) wage-setting power of 
monopsonistic firms rest on the crucial assumption that real-wage setting is untenable in a ‘money 
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therefore fixed once the nominal wage rate, technology, and the market structure of 
commodity markets are set, and it cannot be altered as a result of conflicting claims on 
the labour market that, ceteris paribus, result in nominal wage rate and corresponding 
price changes. 
The investment function used in neo-Kaleckian, neo-Marxian models is, simply put, 
inadequate. It relates investment spending to the profit share and (in the short run during 
periods of disequilibrium, or partial equilibrium, if the capital utilisation rate is used as a 
short-term adjustment instrument) to the capacity utilisation rate (see e.g. 
Lavoie/Rodriguez/Seccareccia 2004). Neglecting the latter determinant for the reasons 
set out in footnote 3, above, to accord the profit share (and thus the profit rate) such a 
prominent role in determining investment spending clearly serves the purpose of closing 
the distributional system. This is done by also making savings dependent on the profit 
share and assuming that investment and savings are independent. By thus equating I and 
S (as an equilibrium condition), the (equilibrium) profit share and, implicitly, the 
(equilibrium) mark-up is determined and the distributional system closed. This reasoning 
is flawed on three counts: 1) simply relating investment demand to (realised) profits is 
certainly not a convincing rationale for action in a world in which capitalists do not merely 
accumulate but also have to choose between investing, consuming, and maintaining 
liquidity. What is needed here is a comparison between expected profits and an 
independent opportunity cost factor such as the interest rate in (Post-)Keynesian 
determination. To take actual profits as a proxy for expected profits, as is explicitly the 
case in Badhuri/Marglin (1990: 380), is to assume an entirely static world.  This would 
be a very strange notion and would still not be enough to determine investment demand 
as long as the interest rate is not taken into account. And even if we were to include the 
interest rate as an additional factor in the investment function, as has occasionally been 
done (see e.g. Stockhammer/Onaran 2013: 64), this does not help as long as the interest 
rate is not the factor that keeps capital scarce (i.e. that restricts capital accumulation) 
because it ‘rules the roost’ of the ‘own rates of interest’ (Keynes 1936: 223). In neo-
Kaleckian, neo-Marxian theories, the interest rate is merely the ‘financial twin’ of the 
profit rate, which primarily fulfils an allocational (and distributional) function between 
capitalists and rentiers. In other words, in neo-Kaleckian, neo-Marxian models it is the 
profit rate that determines the interest rate in the long run, rather than the other way 
around.11 Including the interest rate in the investment function therefore does not really 
help. 2) Ever since Keynes’ treatment of savings and investment in his General Theory, 
we have known that both variables are mere accounting identities: they cannot diverge 
from each other. Any investment spending therefore creates, uno actu, an equal amount 
of savings.12 Using terms such as ‘desired’, ‘planned’, ‘full employment’, and so on, we  
                                                          
wage economy’ (see Keynes 1933: 78).  
11 Among the classical economists, Marx is the most explicit about this: ‘Since interest is merely 
a part of proﬁt, paid according to our assumption by the industrial capitalist to the money-
capitalist, the maximum limit of interest is marked by proﬁt itself, and in that case the portion 
pocketed by the productive capitalist would be equal to zero’ (Marx 1894: 421). This must be so 
for purely logical reasons, since otherwise, as the distributional system has only one degree of 
freedom, it would be overdetermined. 
12 For an illustrative treatment see e.g. Terzi (1986/87). Keynes (1936: 81) argues that ‘The 
 6 
 
can define these categories in such a way that they may diverge, so that ‘planned’ or 
‘desired’ savings may be lower than ‘planned’ or ‘desired’ investment. Yet this does not 
explain why and how a change in functional income distribution is supposed to overcome 
this inequality. In the short run, of course, any errors in predicting the correct (i.e. ex post 
realised) amount of effective demand leading to a situation of ex-ante ‘over-investment’ 
(i.e. the underrating of households’ propensity to save) will be ‘resolved (i.e. brought into 
numerical equality ex post) by a change in functional income distribution to the detriment 
of profit earners. Nevertheless, once capacities are adjusted accordingly (in the long run), 
the initial income distribution will prevail as long as the technical conditions and market 
structures have not changed. In the long run, then, income distribution is simply not 
needed as an equilibrating mechanism (and in the short run, functional income 
distribution has a purely passive role, which does not fit the ‘regime’ metaphor). This is 
the third reason why the treatment of investment in the neo-Kaleckian, neo-Marxian 
models is inadequate: once we accept that the mark-up is not a question of class conflict, 
the distributional system proves to be closed and does not require any (theoretically 
dismissible) I-S equalisation mechanism.          
Finally, when treating an economy as merely a part of a bigger whole – as when a single 
country is treated as part of the whole world economy – the real wage rate in that local 
economy may certainly become an endogenous variable that can be ‘controlled’ by 
nominal wage changes in the one country if we disregard similar nominal wage rate 
movements in the rest of the world or, more realistically, the kind of compensating 
exchange rate movements predicted by ordinary purchasing power parity (exchange rate) 
theory. In this case, the impact of nominal and real wage changes on the price 
competitiveness of the individual country in relation to its trading partners will certainly 
bolster the profit-led line of argument. Nevertheless, the substance of the argument 
concerns price elasticity, rather than functional income distribution. Let us assume, for 
example, that in the initial period the country is neither importing nor exporting to the 
rest of the world. If we now reduce the nominal wage rate in that country, prices and the 
entire price level will change proportionately, leaving the real wage rate (and functional 
income distribution) unchanged. If the nominal wages in the rest of the world or the 
exchange rates do not change in the same way, however, and we assume an ordinary 
(negative) price elasticity of exports in the given country, effective demand in that country 
will be increased. 
Bhaduri/Marglin promise that the ‘thought experiment’ of exogenising functional income 
distribution will produce valuable insights. These can now be summarised as follows: 1) 
                                                          
prevalence of the idea that saving and investment […] can differ from one another, is to be 
explained, I think, by an optical illusion due to regarding an individual depositor’s relation to his 
bank as being a one-sided transaction, instead of seeing it as the two-sided transaction which it 
actually is. It is supposed that a depositor and his bank can somehow contrive between them to 
perform an operation by which savings can disappear into the banking system so that they are lost 
to investment, or, contrariwise, that the banking system can make it possible for investment to 
occur, to which no saving corresponds. But no one can save without acquiring an asset, whether 
it be cash or debt or capital-goods; and no one can acquire an asset which he did not previously 
possess, unless either an asset of equal value is newly produced or someone else parts with an 
asset of that value which he previously had. In the first alternative there is a corresponding new 
investment: in the second alternative someone else must be dis-saving an equal sum.’  
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determining the profit margin via class conflict is crucial to the entire project. If this 
assumption is rejected on analytical grounds, functional income distribution proves – in 
this type of model – to be endogenously determined via economic activity on the basis of 
technological factors and the degree of competition on commodity markets. 2) A Leontief 
production function is required to close the distributional system by assuming fixed 
capital and labour coefficients (or productivity). Nevertheless, assuming fixed 
coefficients in this way will only provide a solution to functional income distribution if 
the choice of technique13 has been settled. This can only be achieved, however, if the real 
wage rate or the interest rate is set exogenously. As we have argued above, the real wage 
rate is an endogenous variable. As Keynes (1936: 222ff.) and Sraffa (1960: 33)14 have 
proposed, the interest rate must then be the variable that closes the distributional system. 
3) Investment spending as the core of the growth model is purpose-built rather than 
empirically or analytically derived. Its purpose is to show that growth (or accumulation 
through investment) is determined by functional income distribution and thus becomes a 
petitio principii.         
3. The empirical dimensions of wage-led and profit-led regimes 
A Two different hypothesis can be derived from the neo-Kaleckian, neo-Marxian growth 
models: 
(1) There is a causal (long-run) relationship between functional income 
distribution and economic growth 
(2) The impact of an exogenous change in functional income distribution can 
either be wage or profit-led. 
The first hypothesis is fundamental for the whole idea of distributional regimes as 
economic policy measures based on exogenous encroachment into functional income 
distribution. The second hypothesis leaves room for an empirical settlement of the 
apparently open question of the signs of impact. Logically, the first hypothesis precedes 
the second. Nevertheless, to my knowledge, none of the empirical studies that have tested 
the wage and profit-led regime has ever been concerned with testing hypothesis (1); these 
studies have rather simply assumed the exogeneity of functional income distribution and 
its causal relationship to economic growth.15  
                                                          
13 Assuming a Leontief production function does not exclude the possibility of different ‘Leontief 
techniques’ using different fixed coefficients to produce the same output. Which of these different 
techniques – with higher or lower capital or labour coefficients – will be used depends on the 
relative rates of remuneration of the factors of production. 
14 While Keynes’ position that the interest rate is a purely monetary phenomenon (which is based 
on his conception of liquidity preference) is quite clear, if not undisputed, there has been a long 
and unresolved discussion about Sraffa’s position (see e.g. Pivetti 1985; Panico 1988; Nell 1988). 
Nevertheless, this is not our concern here. 
15 Even if a long-run co-integration between functional income distribution and economic growth 
could be established – as I suppose it could (see e.g. Charpe/Bridji/McAdam 2019) – this would 
not imply any causation. Take the example provided by Skott (2017: 342 ff.), in which effective 
competition regulations on commodity markets increase both the growth rate and the wage rate 
by reducing the mark-up. The resulting change in functional income distribution does not causally 
affect the growth rate. The same is true if we consider the case of the ‘revenge of the rentier’ (an 
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The second hypothesis has mostly been tested indirectly, either by using single equation 
estimations of the different components of effective demand or structural autoregression 
(VAR) models for many different countries or country groups and different functional 
specifications. What these studies have produced is not an estimation of the long-run 
positive or negative impact of the change in functional income distribution on the growth 
rate but rather short-run estimations of consumption, investment and the export 
elasticities of changes in wages, profits, nominal unit labour cost and other additional 
factors. As long as technological change has not been controlled for and no long-run co-
integration test has been performed, the empirical studies cannot be regarded as 
fallibilistic, positivist tests, but are merely indirect empirical estimations of the sign and 
magnitude of impact of an assumed change in functional income distribution on effective 
demand, and thereby as an attempt to discriminate between the possibility of a wage-led 
or profit-led scenario. 
It is at this point that the empirical literature on neo-Kaleckian, neo-Marxian growth 
models becomes particularly disappointing: not only is it inconclusive insofar as different 
studies come to contrary conclusions on the relevant signs – i.e. on whether a country is 
to be regarded as wage or profit-led. Italy appears to be the only country that has not 
produced such contradictory results (see Stockhammer/Onaran 2013). Moreover, the 
results seem not only to be inconclusive for countries such as Germany and France, which  
are hard to assess and predict with respect to their openness (more closed economies are 
more likely to be wage-led); even indisputably small, open economies such as the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Australia and indisputably large, closed economies such as the 
Euro area or the USA generate contradictory results.  
Numerous explanations have been proposed for these contradictory results, including 
different empirical techniques, different specifications, different temporal dimensions 
(short and long-term outlooks), different perspectives with regard to domestic or total 
demand, and different perspectives with regard to the influence of personal income 
distributions (see Stockhammer/Onaran 2013; Lavoie 2017; Skott 2016; Stockhammer 
2017), yet it is nonetheless a devastating objection if neither theoretical reasoning nor 
empirical evidence can ultimately identify the nature of a distributional regime in a single 
country. 
4.  Policy implications 
Neo-Kaleckian, neo-Marxian growth models are regarded as a challenge to the 
mainstream, supply-side economic policy recommendations characteristic of the 
neoliberal era (see e.g. Lavoie/Stockhammer 2012b). These policies, which include  
labour market deregulation, welfare state retrenchment, and collective bargaining 
decentralisation, have (along with the processes of globalisation and financialisation) 
reduced the wage share over a long period and thus hampered economic growth. 
According to the above analysis, this is nonetheless only true if an economy is identified 
as wage-led, since mainstream supply-side measures (which from a Marxian point of 
                                                          
ongoing increase in the real interest rate) which may be associated but surely not causally linked 
with an obstacle to long-term growth and an increase in the profit share (see Seccareccia/Lavoie 
2016: 209-10.).       
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view are obligatory in a capitalist world (see Boddy/Crotty 1975)) would otherwise be 
necessary to maintain profitability as a major source of the accumulation process. This 
appears to be the reason why most of the relevant literature either assumes – despite the 
inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence – that countries are wage-led (see e.g. 
Stockhammer/Onaran 2013) or at least claims that a wage-led regime would prevail if a 
certain wage policy (expansionary or restrictive) were to become a global strategy (see 
Lavoie/Stockhammer 2012b: 33).16 
At least in most countries, however, wage policy is pursued by trade unions and 
employers’ organisations, but does not constitute an area of governmental policy. 
Functional income distribution is therefore not an instrument of economic policy. The 
outcome of the wage bargaining process thus cannot be easily influenced by a government 
following any form of wage regime. What can then be done to ensure that a wage-led 
regime remains viable (assuming the country intending to follow such a regime is, in fact, 
wage-led)? Beyond simply providing political support to trade unions in the bargaining 
process, it has been argued that any measure that strengthens the position of trade unions 
in their struggle to achieve a fair income share will be helpful (see e.g. 
Lavoie/Stockhammer 2013b: 34; Stockhammer/Onaran 2013: ). Such measures include 
introducing and increasing minimum wages, increasing the reservation wage via social 
policy, and strengthening collective bargaining. In conjunction with policies to regulate 
international financial markets (i.e. to re-balance the power relations between capital and 
labour which have been distorted due to the process of globalisation and financialisation), 
all of these proposed measures aim to pacify the ‘class conflict’, yet our analysis showed 
that functional income distribution is primarily determined by an exogenous variable 
which is certainly not the real wage nor the structure of the commodity markets. With 
regard to the use of monetary policy (to set or influence the exgoneous variable) and 
competition policy (to maintain or restore competition on commodity markets) the 
relevant literature remains rather silent.  
Although it has been acknowledged that a wage-led strategy is ‘certainly too small in 
magnitude to be sufficient as a stabilisation policy in the medium term’ 
(Stockhammer/Onaran 2013: 75; see also Onaran 2016), policy recommendations based 
on the distributional regime approach are often still proposed as an ‘equitable strategy for 
economic recovery’ (Lavoie/Stockhammer 2013b) which ’aims at establishing a full-
employment growth model in which sustained wage growth drives demand via 
consumption growth and via accelerator effects of investment growth as well as 
productivity growth via labor saving technological change’ (Stockhammer/Onaran 2013: 
74). Furthermore, following a ‘wage-led’ strategy is regarded as a means of replacing a 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’, export-oriented strategy with one that places domestic demand 
centre stage and that thus mitigates the danger and likelihood of trade conflicts. While we 
may acknowledge that economic policy strategies that aim to increase an economy’s price 
competitiveness by reducing relative nominal unit labour cost may indeed foster domestic 
growth to the detriment of trading partners, this outcome is independent of whether such 
a policy impacts on functional income distribution. In other words: the ‘beggar-thy-
                                                          
16 See Razmi (2018) for a critique of the claim that the world as a whole (i.e. a closed economy) 
must be wage-led. 
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neighbour’ argument is unrelated to the distributional considerations of the wage-led-
approach. 
In sum, it does not seem unfair to say that neo-Kaleckian, neo-Marxian growth models 
do not focus on the dimensions of economic policy and polity. 
5. Conclusion 
The initial task of this paper was to evaluate the wage-led, profit-led regime approach as 
an SRP. Our question was essentially whether such an approach provides a promising 
means of integrating income inequality – which is perhaps the most socially problematic 
development of the last four decades – into heterodox modelling. Rising income 
inequality is not simply a social problem when attended by rising poverty rates and a 
political problem when the legitimacy of ever higher relative and absolute income at the 
higher end of the income scale is called into question (see e.g. Mongiovi 2015: 564); it is 
also an economic problem when the generation of income itself is hampered by income 
inequality through the effective demand channel. This is of course anything but a new 
insight and has always played a role in heterodox models – though arguably not to the 
extent that it should (see Lopez-Bernardo/Lopez-Martinez/Stockhammer 2016: 198ff.). 
Nevertheless, where income distribution is concerned, the focus of attention in recent 
years has been on personal income distribution rather than functional income 
distribution.17 This is quite right, since personal income inequality has exploded in recent 
decades across the world and independently of the measures used to assess it (gini-
coefficient or income deciles). Now functional income distribution may of course 
influence personal income distribution – yet, the sign of impact is unclear.18 Moreover, 
functional income distribution has remained rather stable in recent decades and few traces 
can be detected of a long ‘neoliberal era’.19 In the US, the wage share fell from around 
66% in 1991 (a cyclical high) with long but rather unpronounced swings by 5.5 
percentage points to 60.4% in 2017. In the UK, it rose with greater variance during the 
same period by 2.5 percentage points, from 63.8% to 66.3%. In the Euro Area it fell rather 
steadily by merely 3 percentage points, from 65.8% to 62.6%, while in France it remained 
                                                          
17 There are two different and unrelated avenues of income inequality research: the first takes 
Okun’s ‘big trade-off’ between equality and efficiency (Okun 1975) as a starting point, in order 
to show how low (wage) income inequality detrimentally affects employment by impeding the 
structural change from industrial production to the service economy (see e.g. OECD 1994; 
Appelbaum/Schettkat 1995; Appelbaum/Schettkat 1996). The second is concerned with 
measuring income inequality and its determinants (see e.g. Atkinson 2015). Nevertheless, both 
research approaches focus on personal rather than functional income distribution. Carvalho/Rezai 
(2016) attempt to add aspects of personal income distribution to neo-Kaleckian, neo-Marxian 
models rendering them more complex, more realistic but also more unpredictable in their regime 
character 
18 And has not yet been thoroughly investigated. For some initial attempts see Glyn (2009); 
Ranaldi (2018). 
19 Makrevska Disoska/Toshevska-Trpcesvka (2016: 327) speak of a ‘dramatic decline…during 
the post-1980s neoliberal era’ of the wage share. This alarming evaluation certainly does not fit 
the facts: Charpe/Bridji/McAdam (2019) speculate on thirty to forty years cycles of wage shares 
with the recent decline in some countries as rather ‘normal’ development from a historical 
perspective. 
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almost constant with only little variance.20 Although ‘Bowley’s law’, which claims that 
such long-run constancy of functional income distribution is the ‘normal’ outcome, has 
been strongly contested in recent research (see e.g. Bentolila/Saint-Paul 2003; Elsby 
2013; Charpe/Bridji/McAdams 2019), a moderate (cyclical) fall in the wage share appears 
unproblematic21 and can easily be explained by technological factors, concentration 
processes in commodity markets, and the long-run development of liquidity preferences 
among wealth owners in maturing economies22. There is certainly no need for a class 
conflict narrative here – a narrative that, it has been argued, cannot be theoretically 
substantiated. 
Furthermore, the policy recommendations arising from the distributional regime approach 
are both unfocussed and risky. They are unfocussed insofar as political actors have few 
means of interfering directly in the wage bargaining process. All of the measures intended 
to strengthen labour may or may not increase the wage share. Since functional income 
distribution is endogenously determined, it ultimately depends – ceteris paribus – on the 
impact of wage settlements on interest rates. And this is where the recommendations may 
become risky: on the one hand, they neglect the possibility of an inflationary process 
triggered by excessive nominal wage claims,23 which may easily push the central bank to 
raise (short-term) interest rates and may seduce wealth owners to increase their liquidity 
preference (thus impacting long-term interest rates) in order to guard against growing 
uncertainty. On the other hand, focussing on wage policy may leave other more important 
policy areas such as fiscal and monetary policy underexposed. Moreover, even if class 
conflict were capable of intentionally changing functional income distribution, as long as 
there is reasonable doubt about the identification of a particular economy as either wage 
or profit-led, any responsible government would be well-advised not to place too much 
emphasis on a strategy that may easily turn out to miss its mark.    
If the above considerations are correct, neo-Kaleckian and neo-Marxian regime 
approaches cannot be considered a promising SRP but have to be regarded as scientific 
                                                          
20 These data are drawn from the European Commission’s Ameco database and show the adjusted 
wage share of the total economy as a percentage of current GDP at current factor cost. If the 
period under investigation is shortened to consider only the 2000s and 2010s, the functional 
income distribution trend becomes even less clear. Lavoie/Stockhammer (2013b:13) discuss 
developments in functional and personal income distribution as though the two concepts were 
similar, co-move together and can therefore be used interchangeably. This is misleading at the 
least. 
21 Particularly if it takes place in conjunction with a compression of personal income distribution. 
22 See e.g. Autor et al. (2017) for the impact of market concentration on functional income 
distribution or Kohler/Guschanski/Stockhammer (2019) for the impact of financialisation. 
23 Wage claims become ‘too high’ when they exceed the margin given by the productivity increase 
and ‘accepted’ (by the central bank) inflation rate. 
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cul-de-sac24 that have produced much self-reflection and idiocentrism25 but few helpful 
insights for policy procurement, and through their self-inflicted focus on functional 
income distribution have even distracted from more important questions of personal 
income distribution and the incorporation of wage policy into a strategy of coordinated 
macroeconomic policies to boost growth and employment (see e.g. Heise 2006; Heise 
2009) – however this ultimately impacts functional income distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 A very similar conclusion has been drawn by Peter Skott (2017: 354): ‘I do not believe, 
however, that the current focus on wage versus profit led growth has been very helpful.’ 
Stockhammer/Ramskogler (2013: 52ff.) put forward a number of recommendations for Post 
Keynesian Economics (PKE) to move forward, i.e. prerequisites for PKE to be seen as a 
promising SRP. Among them are the recommendations of ‚be politically relevant‘ and ‚be more 
Post and less Keynesian‘ – the latter has been justified not in terms of analysis but in terms of 
subjects being investigated. With respect to the distributional regime approach (as a variant of 
PKE), the first recommendation appears not to be lived up to, while the second recommendation 
should probably be reversed: ‚be less Post and more Keynesian‘ in analytical terms as much as in 
subjects being investigated. 
25 This is not to be taken as a reproach but as a fact (see e.g. Lavoie 2017). Indeed, this is how 
science advances: by providing extensions, alterations, or alternatives to existing models and 
empirical tests. It nonetheless also comes with opportunity costs. 
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